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ISSUES RAISED IN VIEW OF THE STATE'S REPONSE
I.

Whether the unfair prejudice is cured by jury instructions alone.

II.

Whether the prosecutor needs to read the evidence he intends to rely on for a
conviction.

III.

Whether the trial judge can force the defendant to go to trial to get a ruling on a
purely legal issue.

IV.

Whether the state need only promulgate rules with the force and effect of law
when authorized by the legislature, and may do so as it pleases in all other
instances.

V.

Whether McNeely affected implied consent enough to entitle the defendant to a
decision on the merits.
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ARGUMENT

I.
The state argues that the defendant was not prejudiced by the joinder in this case, and that
the issue was up to the judge's discretion so long as joinder in the first instance was proper. The
defendant concedes that the case law cited by the state does show that whether prejudice exists
such that a Motion to Sever should be granted is at the court's discretion. However, the
Magistrate's denial should be overturned even under the abuse of discretion standard.
The state argues that no defense could have been compromised. However, the issues are
quite different. The only issue the two crimes have in common is driving. Compare J.C. § 188004 and I.C. § 18-8001. Whether the defendant had a blood alcohol level of .08 or above and
whether she knew her license was suspended are quite different. The defendant could not have
testified on one issue and not the other. See State v. Abel, 104 Idaho 864, 867 (1984).
Moreover, the state relies on court instructions to do the impossible. The Court of Appeals
recently recognized that unfair prejudice results where juries are presented with other bad acts
evidence. See State v. Ortega, --- P.3d ---, 2014 WL 4802584 at *5-6 (Idaho Ct.App.2014). In
this case, there is no "probative" to weigh against the prejudice. The jury is simply to be given a
portrait of a woman who drives not only without a license but while intoxicated. Each of these
acts should be evaluated on their merits, but science and common sense tell us they will not be.
There is a grave risk that the jury will be subtly influenced to convict by the attentional bias, the
bandwagon effect, confirmation bias, the framing effect, selective perception, and the
Semmelweis reflex. The use of bad character to prove crime died in 1684. See 1 Wigmore,

Evidence § 194 at 646 n. 1. This Court must not resurrect the practice in modern Idaho under the
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guise of a hollow belief

jury instructions. See Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury

Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating Groups,
LAW,

PSYCHOLOGY,

Making:
POLICY, AND

Vol. 7(3) (2001); Michael J. Saks & Roselle L. Wissler, On the inefficacy of limiting

instructions: When jurors use prior conviction evidence to decide on guilt,

LA w AND HUMAN

BEHAVIOR, Vol 9( 1) ( 1985).

II.
The state argues that prosecutors need not review all the evidence in their cases because it
they do not have any duty to gather evidence for a defendant or investigate his or her case. The
state cites to a number of opinions in which the court was confronted by defendants taking the
state to task for negligently losing evidence or not collecting certain forensic evidence. As the
Court put it in State v. Reyna, 92 Idaho 669 (1968), these are hybrid "best evidence rule" claims.
The state even goes so far as to cite Queen v. State, 146 Idaho 502 (Ct.App.2008). In that
case, the Court of Appeals found:
Due process requires all material exculpatory evidence known to the state or in its
possession be disclosed to the defendant. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963); Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 64 (2004). See also I.C.R. 16(a). There are
three essential components of a true Brady violation. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S.
263, 281-82 (1999); Dunlap, 141 Idaho at 64. First, the evidence at issue must be
favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or because it is
impeaching. Dunlap, 141 Idaho at 64. Next, the evidence must have been
suppressed by the state, either willfully or inadvertently. Id Finally, prejudice
must have ensued. Id The duty of disclosure enunciated in Brady is an obligation
of not just the individual prosecutor assigned to the case, but of all the
government agents having a significant role in investigating and prosecuting the
offense. State v. Avelar, 132 Idaho 775, 781 (1999); State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho
428, 433 (Ct.App.1994). However, a prosecutor is not required to disclose
evidence the prosecutor does not possess or evidence of which the prosecutor
could not reasonably be imputed to have knowledge or control. Avelar, 132 Idaho
at 781.
,..,

- .) -

Queen argues on appeal, pursuant to I.C.R. 16(b)(6), that
information
regarding Cline's prior felonies was within the knowledge of the prosecuting
accessible by the state through a records check.
attorney because it was
The state does not
specifically to Queen's argument regarding
16(b)( 6), but it argues generally that Queen is estopped from raising this issue on
appeal because of his stipulation that the information was not known to the state.
Idaho Criminal Rule l 6(b )( 6) provides, in pertinent part, that upon written request
by the defendant the prosecuting attorney shall furnish the names of individuals
who may be called as witnesses "together with any record of prior felony
convictions of any such person which is within the knowledge of the prosecuting
attorney." In this case, Queen's post-conviction counsel stipulated that the state
did not have actual knowledge of Cline's prior felony convictions. The plain
language of I. C.R. 16(b)( 6) requires disclosure of a potential witness's felony
convictions only if that information is within the knowledge of the prosecuting
attorney. Therefore, based on Queen's stipulation and the plain language of I.C.R.
16(b)(6), we conclude that Queen has failed to show that the state committed a
discovery violation by failing to provide this information.

We begin by noting that the NCIC database is maintained by the FBI, not the
state. See State v. Parkinson, 144 Idaho 825, 826 (2007). However, that does not
end our inquiry. The "duty of disclosure enunciated in Brady is an obligation of
not just the individual prosecutor assigned to the case, but of all the government
agents having a significant role in investigating and prosecuting the offense."
Gardner, 126 Idaho at 433. See also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,437 (1995)
(concluding that "the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable
evidence known to others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including
the police") (emphasis added). In Gardner, we concluded that the state had an
obligation to disclose an eye witness's statement taken at the scene of an accident
by a police officer even though the prosecuting attorney had no actual knowledge
of the existence of the statement. Gardner, 126 Idaho at 433. However, a
prosecutor is not required to disclose evidence the prosecutor does not possess or
evidence of which the prosecutor could not reasonably be imputed to have
knowledge or control. Avelar, 132 Idaho at 781. In Avelar, the Idaho Supreme
Court noted that information held in the minds of government witnesses is
generally not imputed to the prosecution unless that information was discovered
by the police or prosecution. Id.

Id. at 504-5. Thus, Queen, Kyles, and Gardner stand for the proposition that the government
must disclose information known to the police or prosecution. The only way the state could
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think this is a useful finding is

the state takes these opinions at their literal meaning and severs

them from reality.
For how, exactly, is a police officer to be required to present evidence he is aware of to
the defendant? This Court knows that all such disclosures are made through the prosecutor. By
requiring that statements known to police officers be disclosed, the reality is that prosecutors are
required to do at least enough investigation of their own case to know what has been said and by
whom. Similarly, prosecutors are expected to have at least reviewed the foundational evidence
they intend to rely on. The state insists on an ostrich rule. If the prosecutor points the defendant
to a document in the possession of the police and makes it available to be inspected, then the
machinery of "justice" can continue to whir unimpeded. That rule conflicts with not only the
concept of the prosecutor as a minister of justice, but with the special ethical obligations of that
office. See I.R.P.C. 3.8(a). The judiciary should not hold that prosecutors can avoid their
obligations by simply refusing to review the evidence in their own cases.

III.
A. Review
The state argues that this Court should not review the issues presented in the defendant's
Motion in Limine because the issue was not ruled on by the Magistrate, who stated he would rule
at trial. The state cites to State v. Dopp, 129 Idaho 597, 603 (Ct.App.1996) for the rationale that
"[b ]ecause a motion in limine is based on an alleged or anticipated factual scenario" there is no
reason a court cannot wait to determine such issues at trial. This case, however, did not involve a
factual scenario. While the Court might have disagreed with a blanket ruling excluding the
breath test result as the defendant had requested, the Magistrate still could and should have
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resolved the legal

had identified.

p. 15, L. 4-25, 16, L. 1-12. Further, the

Idaho Supreme Court
Constitution, and should do so due to the importance of the issues to the functioning of the courts
and the separation of powers.
B. Idaho Administrative Procedures Act
The state begins its argument by claiming that agencies only need to promulgate rules
where specifically authorized by statute. State's Brief at 34 quoting LC. § 67-5231(1). That is a
fundamental misunderstanding of the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act. Rather:
The regulations that have the "force and effect of law" did not come through
legislative enactment directly, but were adopted by administrators by authority of
the legislature embodied in a statute.

Mead v. Arnell, 117 Idaho 660, 668 (1990). The same misunderstanding of government power
was posited by the executive in the Asarco matter:
As a preliminary matter, contrary to DEQ's arguments, an agency action is not a
rule because it was promulgated according to rulemaking authority and has the
force and effect of law. Rather, an agency action characterized as a rule must be
promulgated according to statutory directives for rulemaking in order to have the
force and effect of law. See l.C. § 67-5231 (declaring rules void unless adopted in
substantial compliance with the requirements of the IAPA); Mead v. Arnell, 117
Idaho 660, 664, 791 P .2d 410, 414 (1989) (holding rules promulgated by agency
action have the force and effect of law). See also lvfinidoka Memorial Hospital v.
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, l 08 Idaho 344, 699 P .2d 1358 (1985)
(holding state policy, implemented as a rule without being promulgated as a rule,
was unenforceable) and Bingham jvfemorial Hospital v. Idaho Department of
Health and Welfare, 108 Idaho 346,699 P.2d 1360 (1985) (same). Furthermore,
even if DEQ has the discretion under the Clean Water Act to determine whether
or not the TMDL will have the force and effect of law in Idaho, under Idaho
administrative law, the TMDL is still a rule and must be promulgated in
accordance with the IAP A in order to be valid.

Asarco, Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 719, 723 (2003). Thus, it is not that the executive can do
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whatever it wants except when authorized by statute, but that it has no power, whatsoever, to
create rules that can have the force

effect of law except when granted that power by

legislature. Considering what an incredible misunderstanding of ID APA this is, defense counsel
is less surprised by the history of irresponsible and illegal acts on the part of the ISP. Evidently,
the executive was under the impression that it could choose to make rules or not, except where
explicitly told it was authorized to do so. See State's Brief at 35.
The Attorney General would clearly benefit from a thorough reading of Mead, so as to
remind itself that:
A1iicle 2, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution provides for the separation of powers
among the three branches ofldaho's government. Article 3, § 1 provides that the
power to pass bills is vested in the legislature. Article 3, § 15 provides that, "[ n ]o
law shall be passed except by bill, ... " Read together, these three constitutional
provisions stand for the proposition that, of Idaho's three branches of government,
only the legislature has the power to make "law." See State v. Nelson, 36 Idaho
713,213 P. 358 (1923); State v. Purcell, 39 Idaho 642,228 P. 796 (1924);
Suppiger v. Enking, 60 Idaho 292, 91 P.2d 362 (1939); Board of County Com'rs of
Twin Falls County v. Idaho Health Fae. Auth., 96 Idaho 498, 531 P.2d 588
(1975).
While the power to make law lies exclusively within the province of the
legislature, (Idaho Constitution, art. 3 §§ 1, 15) "the legislature may
constitutionally leave to administrative agencies the selection of the means and the
time and place of the execution of the legislative purpose, and to that end may
prescribe suitable rules and regulations." State v. Taylor, 58 Idaho 656, 664, 78
P.2d 125, 128 (1938). Administrative agencies do this by enacting rules and
regulations. See Idaho Code tit. 67, ch. 52. However, while these rules and
regulations may be given the "force and effect of law," they do not rise to the level
of statutory law. Only the legislature can make law. Idaho Power v. Blomquist, 26
Idaho 222, 141 P. 1083 (1914); State v. Nelson, 36 Idaho 713,213 P. 358 (1923);
overruled on other grounds, Greater Boise Aud. v. Royal Inn of Boise, 106 Idaho
884, 684 P.2d 286 (1984); State v. Purcell, 39 Idaho 642, 228 P. 796 (1924);
Marshall v. Department ofAgric., 44 Idaho 440, 258 P. 171 (1927); Chambers v.
J\;JcCollum, 47 Idaho 74,272 P. 707 (1928); State v. Heitz, 72 Idaho 107,238 P.2d
439 (1951 ); Idaho Savs. & Loan Ass'n v. Roden, 82 Idaho 128, 350 P.2d 225
(1960); Boise Redevelopment Agency v. Yick Kong Corp., 94 Idaho 876, 499 P .2d
-7-

575 (1972); Board a/County Com'rs of Twin Falls County v. Idaho Health Fae.
Auth., 96 Idaho 498, 1 P.2d 588 (1975); and Kerner v. Johnson, 99 Idaho
P.2d 360 (1

Mead, 117 Idaho at 664. Once one recognizes that the executive has no power to make law, that
ID APA must be followed if an agency wishes to create rules that affect the rights of others, and
that the foundation for the admission of evidence at the defendant's criminal trial affects the
defendant's right to Due Process, then it becomes clear that the ISP must follow IDAP A when
promulgating the procedure that will be the sole foundation for evidence in a criminal trial.
The Idaho Comi of Appeals' precedent is not to the contrary. The Court held in State v.

Bell, 115 Idaho 36 (Ct.App.1988) that the legislature had created a short form to introduce
evidence by passing I.C. § 18-8004. The Court found in State v. Van Sickle, 120 Idaho 99
(Ct.App.1991) that I.R.E. 901 (b )(10) allows the legislature to determine a condition whereby
evidence is authenticated, such as in that case the reliability of an Intoxilyzer 3000 breath testing
machine. In both of those cases, the Court was reviewing the administrative rules promulgated
by the Idaho Department Health and Welfare. In State v. 1\lfills, 128 Idaho 426 (Ct.App.1996),
the Court for the first and only time encountered the issue of whether "policy statements" could
affect rights, but did not reach the issue because it was not preserved below. In State v.

Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 410-11 (Ct.App.1999), the Court rejected the argument that I.C. § 188004 violated the separation of powers and I.R.E. 1102. The Court in Nickerson with little
explanation held that LC. § 18-8004 "specifies one means by which the necessary foundation
may be established ... " Id. at 411. That is of course not true, as the state so points out. State's
Brief at 35. The state does not believe that even IDAPA can affect I.C. § 18-8004. It is hard to
understand how the Nickerson Court came to the conclusion that I.C. § 18-8004 was not the sole
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foundation that could be laid so long as the executive promulgated rules. It is also unclear what
Court was relying on for the principle that, simply because the Court had addressed
procedures adopted by the Department of Health and Welfare ten year prior, there was no conflict
with I.R.E. 1102 when a law purported to determine the proper foundation for evidence and
waive the requirement for expert testimony. Moreover, the Court did not consider the fact that
the legislature had given those powers to the executive, and so essentially the wolf had been
placed in charge of the hen house.
None of these cases, however, actually held that l.C. § 18-8004(4) allowed the executive
to come up with whatever rules it pleased. In other states, the procedures for breath testing are
set by statute. See, e.g., A.R.S. § 5-395.02; C.G.S.A. 14-227a; 10 G.C.A. § 69202. Even Idaho
requires a fifteen minute wait period between breath samples for the Employer Alcohol and
Drug-Free Workplace Act. See I.C. § 72-1704. The Idaho Court of Appeals has ruled, despite
I.R.E. 1102, that the legislature may set the procedure in Idaho for the foundational procedure for
the introduction of breath samples in criminal trials. The Court of Appeals has tacitly allowed
that task to be delegated to the executive. But the Court has never held that I.C. § 18-8004(4)
was a blank check to admit evidence in criminal cases. It has never held that the ISP did not
have to comply with ID APA before creating rules that would have the force and effect of law.
And this Court must not do so now.
To do otherwise would undo our legal system. There is nothing about DUI cases so
unique that the concept that the legislature may simply give the executive carte blanche to
determine what foundation is required for evidence will not spread to every type of case
imaginable. If this Court does not believe it surrendered power to the legislature in Nickerson, it
-9-

should review with a critical eye the legislature's wholesale provision of this branch's power to
the executive. Unless we are to be ruled by tyrants, the

powers from the judiciary to the

executive must stop.
The state also argues for several pages that if the SOPs are rules then the defendant
cannot challenge them. That is true, in a sense. But by "challenge," that does not mean that they
cannot be "challenged" as to their validity for being the foundation of evidence in this case.
Rather, the Court of Appeal's oft repeated holding that the defense can always rebut the
presumption that the procedures adopted by the executive are adequate would be untrue in the
context of a criminal case. Rather, challenging the procedures' accuracy would necessarily have
to be done through the channels etched out by IDAP A. See Kay Manweiler, Somewhere Over the
Rainbow and Through the Looking Glass: Administrative Law Practice and Procedure, Advocate
(Feb. 2002). The state's profound misunderstanding ofIDAPA is likely what leads to its
confusion expressed in footnote one on the tweny-third page of its brief. The Asarco ruling is
not confusing when one realizes that if an agency has a "policy" that it is treating, and forcing
others to treat, as a rule with the force and effect of law, then it is well within the rights of any
citizen and this Court to point out to said agency that its "policy" has no such power, and is, in
point of fact, null and void.
The state ends with an illogical argument that the SOPs are simply internal guidelines
"that, if followed by law enforcement, permit a BAC test result to be introduced in a criminal
proceeding with the necessity of expert testimony pursuant to I. C. § 18-8004(4 ). " State's brief at
43. Assuming the state did not mean this to be ironic, the defense would point this Court to State

v. Jones, 154 Idaho 412,417 (2013). It is hardly a fair trial or tribunal where the accuser is also
- 10 -

the judge determining whether the evidence comes in.

In its response, the state appears to agree that intervening law does provide just cause to
revoke a plea, but disagrees as to the import of the McNeely holding. The state argues 1\1issouri

v. AkNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (U.S.Mo. 2013) that at most, implied consent is revocable. The state
therefore claims that it can threaten us at our doorsteps to force their way into our house so long
as the legislature gives them a law that provides "civil penalties." The defense has provided
authority already that this argument, besides being ludicrous on its face, is simply untrue. For
purposes of a Motion to Withdraw, the very fact that the state agrees McNeely affected implied
consent should mean that the defendant may withdraw her plea and have the issue litigated.

DATED this _ _ _ _ day of October, 2014.

OFFICE OF THE KOOTENAI
COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

BY:
J*y;f:OGSD N, ISB 8759
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
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